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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FERNANDO RUESGA, : Case No. 920426-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1992 Supp.) provides 
this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from a non-capital, 
non-first degree felony conviction from a court of record. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was signing the Adult Probation and Parole agreement a 
valid condition of probation at the time of Mr. Ruesga's refusal to 
sign? 
2. Did Mr. Ruesga willfully violate a condition of 
probation? 
3. Are the trial court's written and oral findings clearly 
erroneous? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's factual findings are reversible if 
clearly erroneous, while the trial court's legal conclusions are 
subject to the correction of error standard of review. State v. 
Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991). Because the trial court did not draft the findings 
himself, but adopted those drafted by counsel, the written findings 
are entitled to less deference on review. See Automatic Control 
Prods. Corp. v.Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 
1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cited with approval in State v. 
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following controlling statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions are in Appendix 1: 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-32-1 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 15. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Ruesga with one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R. 7). 1 On 
February 18, 1992, Mr. Ruesga pled guilty to that charge (R. 19). 
The trial court ordered him to remain unincarcerated and under the 
supervision of Pretrial Services while Adult Probation and Parole 
prepared the presentence investigation report (R. 20). On March 
1. Mr. Ruesga will refer to the district court pleadings 
file as "R.11, to the transcript of April 6, 1992, as "T.11, to the 
transcript of May 4, 1992, as "T.211, to the transcript of May 18, 
1992, as "1.3", to the transcript of June 2, 1992, as "T.4", and to 
the transcript of June 22, 1992, as f,T.5". 
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23, 1992, the trial court ordered Adult Probation in a minute entry 
as follows: "The matter is referred back to APPD to obtain a more 
complete criminal history and to make the necessary matrix 
corrections. If APPD recommends prison, they must state their 
reason(s) for said deviation." (R. 30). 
On April 6, 1992, the trial court sentenced Mr. Ruesga to a 
prison term of zero to five years and fined him $5,000 (R. 33-34). 
The court stayed the sentence pending the completion of 18 months 
probation, requiring Mr. Ruesga to serve six months in jail, and 
suspended all of the fine except $1,500 (and required the payment of 
a 25% surcharge)(R. 33-34, T. 8-9). 
On April 27, 1992, Mr. Ruesga's probation officer filed a 
motion for an order to show cause why Mr. Ruesga's probation should 
not be revoked because he had failed to sign the probation agreement 
(R. 38-39). At the first hearing, on May 4, the trial court 
indicated that defense counsel could have two weeks to work things 
out, and informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the probation agreement 
was a condition of his probation (T.2 4, R. 36-37). On May 18, 
1992, Mr. Ruesga was willing to sign the probation agreement, but 
the trial court set a further hearing on the order to show cause (R. 
43, T.3 3, 8). Following an evidentiary hearing on June 2, 1992, 
the trial court denied Mr. Ruesga7s motion for a Spanish-speaking 
interpreter, and revoked Mr. Ruesga's probation, despite Mr. 
Ruesga's willingness to sign the agreement (R. 45-46, T.4 27). 
The state submitted proposed findings of fact in support of 
the revocation, to which defense counsel objected (R. 57-58), but 
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the trial court signed the findings (R. 81). Defense counsel moved 
the trial court to reconsider his ruling (R. 82-83), and to stay the 
sentence pending appeal (R. 51-52), but the trial court denied these 
motions (R. 88-89). 
On September 16, 1992, this Court granted Mr. Ruesga's 
petition for a certificate of probable cause, and remanded the case 
to the trial court for evaluation of evidence under Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-20-10(1)(c) and setting of conditions of release under 
section 77-20-10(2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court revoked Mr. Ruesga's probation because Mr. 
Ruesga did not sign the probation agreement presented to him in the 
jail by two probation officers ten days after sentencing. A copy of 
the trial court's written findings of probation violation is in 
appendix 2 to this brief. As defense counsel argued, Mr. Ruesga's 
initial failure to sign the probation agreement was not a willful 
violation of probation — the trial court did not initially inform 
Mr. Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of his 
probation (T.4 10-11). Once the trial court informed Mr. Ruesga 
that signing the agreement was a condition of probation (T.2 4), Mr. 
Ruesga was consistently willing to sign (T.3 3, T.4 11, T.5 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In punishing Mr. Ruesga for failing to understand and 
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comply with a condition of probation that was not communicated to 
Mr. Ruesga before the purported violation of that condition of 
probation, the trial court violated due process of law. 
Once Mr. Ruesga learned that signing the probation 
agreement was a condition of probation, he was consistently willing 
to fulfill that obligation. Mr. Ruesga never willfully violated 
probation. 
The trial court's oral and written findings in support of 
probation revocation are clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SIGNING THE PROBATION AGREEMENT 
WAS NOT A CONDITION OF PROBATION 
AT THE TIME THAT MR. RUESGA REFUSED TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. 
Our courts have historically recognized the value of 
probation to both probationers and society, and have consistently 
held that probation and parole revocation must be fair. See Gaanon 
v. Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 783-84 (1973)(the purpose of probation 
is to keep individuals functioning as productive members of 
society); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1971)(society's 
interest in parolee's re-integration into society is disserved by 
arbitrary revocation of parole); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 
666 n.7 (1983)(probation revocations must be fundamentally fair, in 
accordance with federal substantive due process). In State v. 
Zolantakis, 259 P. 1044 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that if the values of probation are to be realized, 
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courts must deal fairly with probationers, stating, 
The purpose of the law permitting the 
suspension of sentence is clearly reformatory. 
If those who are to be reformed cannot implicitly 
rely upon promises or orders contained in the 
suspension of sentence, then we may well expect 
the law to fail in its purpose. Reformation can 
certainly best be accomplished by fair, 
consistent, and straightforward treatment of the 
person sought to be reformed. It would therefore 
seem, both upon authority and principal, that 
when a sentence is suspended during good 
behavior, without reservations, the person whose 
sentence is thus suspended has a vested right to 
rely thereon so long as such condition is 
complied with. The right to personal liberty is 
one of the most sacred and valuable rights of a 
citizen, and should not be regarded lightly. The 
right to personal liberty may be as valuable to 
one convicted of crime as to one not so 
convicted, and so long as one complies with the 
conditions upon which such right is assured by 
judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of 
the same. Such right may not be alternatively 
granted and denied without just cause. 
Id. at 1046. 
Utah historically has guarded the fairness that must govern 
probation revocation, by providing greater procedural protections in 
probation revocations than prevail under the federal constitution.2 
2. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 
(1971)(stating federal due process standards for parole revocation), 
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)(Morrissey 
procedural rules apply to probation revocations) with Christiansen 
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(stating Article I section 7 due 
process standards for probation revocation). Compare Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 422 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973)(courts are to decide case by 
case whether counsel is necessary in probation revocation hearings) 
with State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 and n.7 (Utah 1971)(under 
Article I section 12, if a probationer requests counsel at a 
revocation proceeding, he is entitled to counsel). 
-6 -
Perhaps the most important guideline in insuring fairness 
and success in probation is the rule that courts must state the 
conditions of probation clearly, so that probationers can comply 
with them. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S 430 (1973)(per curiam), the 
Court held that as a matter of due process of law, a probationer 
must have fair advanced warning of the conduct which constitutes a 
probation violation. Id. at 432. See also State v. Hodges, 798 
P.2d 270, 277 (Utah App.)(expanding conditions of probation violates 
"'the requirement that a probationer be clearly and accurately 
apprised of the expectations for remaining on probation.' See State 
v. Dennev, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah Ct.App.1989)(probation sentences 
must be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the 
possibility of confusion and injustice)[, cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989)]; Rich v. State, 640 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska Ct.App. 
1982)(probation conditions must be sufficiently precise and 
unambiguous to inform probationer of conduct essential to retain 
liberty).11), cert, denied No. 900501 (Dec. 26, 1990). As the record 
discussed below demonstrates, at the time that Mr. Ruesga refused to 
sign the probation agreement, the trial court had not informed Mr. 
Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of his probation. 
In sentencing Mr. Ruesga, the trial court stated various 
conditions of probation, but made no mention of a need to sign a 
probation agreement, or of other conditions of probation. The 
court's oral sentence is copied in Appendix 3 to this brief, and 
states, 
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I am going to place you on probation for a 
period of eighteen months, supervised by Adult 
Probation and Parole under the following terms 
and conditions. I'll suspend all but $1,500 of 
the fine. Added to that is the twenty-five 
percent surcharge. The Court is satisfied that 
terms and conditions ought to include the usual 
drug and alcohol conditions. You're not to use 
controlled substances, you're not to have 
paraphernalia in your possession, you're not to 
associate with people who use controlled 
substances, and you are not to have any 
prescriptions, or — from a medical Doctor, 
without your probation officer knowing about it. 
As far as alcohol, you're not to use alcohol 
during the period of time that you're on 
probation. You are to enter into, and 
successfully complete any drug or alcohol 
programs Adult Probation and Parole thinks [are] 
appropriate. Not to, like I say, use alcohol. 
You're not to frequent bars during the period of 
time that you're on probation. I want you 
working full-time, and I want you to establish a 
permanent eiddress. 
The sanction in this, Mr. Ruesga, will be 
that you s€>rve six months in the county jail. 
I'll give you credit for the twenty-one days that 
you've already served. Commitment is forthwith. 
Take him into custody. 
(T. 8-9). 
The trial court's written judgment, sentence and 
commitment, a copy of which is in Appendix 4 to this brief, provides 
a list of conditions not mentioned orally by the trial court, 
including the obligation to conform to general conditions of 
probation (R. 34). This sheet was apparently sent to defense 
counsel at some point (neither the district court pleadings file 
copy, nor counsel's file copy indicate a date of service), but not 
to Mr. Ruesga. The trial court did not mention the additional 
conditions on this document when he sentenced Mr. Ruesga. 
Mr. Ruesga did not speak to defense counsel prior to the 
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encounter with the probation officers, and when they presented him 
with the probation agreement to sign, including conditions of 
probation that Mr. Ruesga had not been forewarned about by the court 
or counsel prior to the encounter with the probation officers, Mr. 
Ruesga refused to sign the agreement, informing the probation 
officers that the conditions in the agreement were not those meted 
out by the court (T.4 8-11). 
It was only after the probation officer filed a motion for 
an order to show cause why probation should not be revoked that the 
trial court informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the probation agreement 
was a condition of his probation. At the hearing on the motion for 
an order to show cause, Mr. Ruesga indicated that he had received 
the motion for an order to show cause, but did not understand it 
(T.2 3). Defense counsel indicated that he had advised Mr. Ruesga 
to deny violating his probation at that hearing, that counsel had 
just received the affidavit in support of probation revocation, and 
that a personal family emergency required counsel's immediate 
attention (T.2 3-4). The trial court indicated that the court would 
permit counsel two weeks to works things out, and informed Mr. 
Ruesga for the first time that signing the probation agreement was a 
condition of probation, stating, "If Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign the 
probation agreement, he's going to prison. Simple as that." (T.2 
4). After Mr. Ruesga was thus informed that signing the agreement 
was a condition of his probation, Mr. Ruesga was consistently 
willing to sign (T.3 3, T.4 11, T.5 5). 
The basis for revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation reflected in 
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the trial court7s written findings is Mr, Ruesga's failure to sign 
the probation agreement when it was presented to him by the 
probation officers (R. 60). Specifically, finding number 5 
indicates, fl[t]hat the failure of the defendant to execute and enter 
into the agreement of probation constitutes a violation of the 
probation granted the defendant by the Court." (R. 60). 
In revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation on the basis of a 
condition of probation that Mr. Ruesga was not informed of prior to 
the purported violation, the trial court violated due process of 
law. Buder, Hodges, Penney, supra. 
II. 
MR. RUESGA DID NOT WILLFULLY 
VIOLATE HIS PROBATION. 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1, and federal 
constitutional law, "[a]s a general rule, in order to revoke 
probation for the violation of a condition of probation not 
involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful or, if 
not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society." State 
v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 270, 275-77 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. No. 
900501 (Dec. 26, 1990). 
The trial court's written findings indicate that "the 
defendant knowingly, intentionally and purposely refused to sign the 
probation agreement presented to him by Agent Shavers" and "the 
failure of the defendant to execute and enter into the agreement of 
probation constitutes a violation of the probation granted the 
defendant by the Court." (R. 60). As explained above in point I, 
the findings are erroneous in that the signing of the probation 
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agreement was not a condition of probation at the time that Mr. 
Ruesga refused to sign in the jail, because the court did not inform 
Mr. Ruesga of that condition when he sentenced Mr. Ruesga, or 
otherwise indicate that a probation officer would present Mr. Ruesga 
with additional conditions of probation. As a corollary to the 
argument in point I, the record demonstrates that Mr. Ruesga's 
failure to sign the probation agreement was not a willful violation 
of probation, but was a result of his failure to understand that 
signing the agreement was a condition of probation. 
At the first hearing, after the trial court had first 
informed Mr. Ruesga that signing the agreement was a condition of 
probation, and had granted a two week continuance, defense counsel 
moved to dismiss the order to show cause, indicating that Mr. Ruesga 
was willing to sign the probation agreement (T.3 3). After the 
prosecutor indicated that Mr. Ruesga should sign the agreement in 
open court, the trial court unexpectedly interjected, "I want to 
know why it hasn't been signed up to this point in time. If Mr. 
Ruesga is going to jerk me around, I'll jerk him around. Why did I 
put him on probation in the first place? What's the State's 
position?" (T.3 3-4). The prosecutor then indicated that perhaps 
the court should reconsider Mr. Ruesga's probation (T.3 4). The 
trial court asked defense counsel why Mr. Ruesga had not signed the 
agreement and defense counsel informed the court that Mr. Ruesga had 
not understood his obligation to do so in the past, but was willing 
to sign the agreement that day (T.3 5). The trial court asked 
defense counsel if Mr. Ruesga would admit the allegation in the 
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affidavit in support of the order to show cause, and defense counsel 
informed the court that he had advised Mr. Ruesga not to admit a 
violation (T.3 5-6). The probation officer, Lisa Shavers,indicated 
that if Mr. Ruesga would sign the agreement, she was willing to 
supervise him, adding that she did not like to argue with people, or 
profanity (T.3 6). The trial court asked Ms. Shavers what Mr. 
Ruesga had said when she presented the agreement, and she indicated, 
He was very profane about you and me, and how you 
could not do these things to him, and you can't 
make him do what you had ordered him to do, and 
so I left. 
(T.3 6). Defense counsel explained that both he and Mr. Ruesga's 
pretrial services supervisor had had initial difficulty 
communicating with Mr. Ruesga, but had subsequently found him to be 
easy to work with (T.3 7). After Mr. Ruesga acknowledged that the 
court would not allow him to go to Mexico to visit his ailing 
parents during the course of probation, as he had been allowed to do 
during pretrial release (T.3 7-8), the trial court informed Mr. 
Ruesga that Mr. Ruesga had a "serious attitude problem," and set the 
matter for further hearing (T.3 8). 
At the June 2, 1992 evidentiary hearing, defense counsel 
requested a Spanish-speaking interpreter, b\it the trial court 
summarily denied the motion, stating, "Too late. Proceed." (T.4 3). 
Ms. Shavers' testimony concerning what Mr. Ruesga had said 
to her was markedly different from her prior testimony that Mr. 
Ruesga had said that the judge had no power to make him comply with 
the probation requirements that the judge had ordered (T.3 6). She 
indicated that she initially contacted Mr. Ruesga in the jail on 
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April 16, ten days after Judge Hanson sentenced Mr. Ruesga (T.4 5). 
She indicated that she and James Ferner, another probation officer, 
spoke with Mr. Ruesga and another inmate in the hallway of the jail, 
and began informing him of the general conditions of the probation 
agreement (T.4 5). The conditions she explained were 
That he has to report monthly between the 
first and the fifth. That he has to give us a 
correct address and let us know before he moves, 
not leaving the State of Utah without written 
permission, those kinds of things. 
(T.4 5). These conditions were different from those stated to Mr. 
Ruesga in court at sentencing by the trial court (T. 8-9). 
She indicated that when she began discussing the conditions 
of probation imposed by Judge Hanson, Mr. Ruesga informed her that 
the $1,875 fine figure she had was incorrect (it represents the 
correct fine plus the 25% surcharge), and became argumentative, 
telling her that the written agreement did not reflect what had 
occurred in court (T.4 6). Mr. Ruesga informed Ms. Shavers that her 
conditions of probation were not the same as the Judge's and that he 
therefore did not have to comply with them (T.4 6). She testified, 
He was extremely argumentative. He said he 
was not — he was not going to comply. He said 
that the figure that I had for the fine of 1,875 
was incorrect; that what I had written down here 
was not what happened in court, that — he just 
became extremely profane, and argumentative, and 
got more and more so. 
He said fuck the Judge, fuck this shit, I'm 
not going to do it. You can't make me do it. 
There was another probationer sitting next to him 
who he told that that man also didn't have to do 
what we were asking, that I couldn't make him do 
it, and that the Judge hadn't said what I was 
telling him to do. 
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He just continued to argue and state that he 
didn't have to do what either Judge Hanson or I 
was asking him to do, and he wasn't going to do 
it. 
(T.4 6-8). 
On cross-examination, Ms. Shavers testified that Mr. Ruesga 
had told her that her conditions of probation were not those stated 
by the judge, and that that was why he did not have to comply with 
her conditions on the agreement (T.4 8-9). 
Mr. Ruesga came to the stand and read to the court a letter 
he had written with assistance (T.4 10-11). In the letter, Mr. 
Ruesga explained his difficulty with the English language, his 
initial failure to understand the need to sign the probation 
agreement, and his willingness to sign the agreement. He indicated 
that he had not spoken with defense counsel after sentencing and did 
not understand what was transpiring when the probation officers 
confronted him in the jail, and that he needed an interpreter (T.4 
10-11). When defense counsel asked Mr. Ruesga if he had agreed to 
sign a probation agreement when he was sentenced in court, Mr. 
Ruesga indicated that he never said anything, that he had pled 
guilty, and that defense counsel had not spoken with Mr. Ruesga to 
explain the details of probation (T.4 11). Mr. Ruesga testified 
that he had not been on probation before, and did not understand how 
it worked when he refused to sign the agreement, but that since he 
had come to understand his obligations, he was willing to comply 
with them fully (T.4 11-12). On cross-examination by the 
prosecutor, Mr. Ruesga again indicated that he had said some words 
to Ms. Shavers, but did not understand what was going on because he 
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had not yet spoken with defense counsel (T.4 13). Mr. Ruesga denied 
having told Ms. Shavers that he did not have to comply with the 
judge's orders (T.4 14), but did tell her that he would rather just 
do his time in jail, rather than be on probation (T.4 14). Mr. 
Ruesga7s letter to the trial court, and a letter from his pretrial 
services supervisor in support of his probation are apparently 
contained in the sealed envelope containing the presentence 
investigation report in the district court pleadings file (R. 44). 
In revoking Mr. Ruesga's probation on the basis of his 
failure to sign the probation agreement, the trial court erroneously 
overlooked the fact that Mr. Ruesga's failure to sign the agreement 
resulted from his lack of knowledge that signing the agreement was a 
condition of probation, rather than from his intent to willfully 
violate the trial court's order. The revocation constitutes a 
violation of federal constitutional law. Hodges, Buder, supra. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
It is the State's burden to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant has violated probation. State v. Hodges. 
798 P.2d 270, 278-79 (Utah App. 1990). The absence of an adequate 
evidentiary basis for probation violation violates federal 
substantive due process. Douglas v. Buder. 412 U.S 430, 432 
(1973)(per curiam). 
In reviewing the evidence on appeal, this Court applies the 
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review. State v. 
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Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991). "In order to prevail, an appellant 'must show that the 
evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court 
abused its discretion in revoking [appellant's] probation.'11 State 
v. Rawlinas, 829 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). 
The written findings drafted by counsel are entitled to less 
deference than would have been due had the trial court drafted the 
findings himself. See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech. 
Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., concurring), 
cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 
1347 (Utah 1990). As a general rule, "[a]n appellant raising issues 
of fact on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshall all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and show that 
evidence to be insufficient." State v. Drobel. 815 P.2d 724, 734 
(Utah App. 1991). However, the marshalling requirement does not 
apply when the findings are legally deficient. Woodward v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous in several different 
circumstances. See State v, Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 
App.)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate 
evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the 
law."), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. Bobo. 803 
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990)("The trial court's factual 
determinations are clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a 'definite and 
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firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'")(citations omitted); 
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990)(to withstand 
appellate review, trial court7s finding of fact must be supported by 
substantial, competent evidence; prosecutor's argument does not 
constitute evidence to support a finding). 
The trial court's written findings, attached in Appendix 2, 
indicate, 
1. That the defendant, when requested by 
probation officer Lisa Shavers, refused to 
execute a standard probation agreement. 
2. That the terms and conditions of 
probation were individually explained to 
defendant by Agent Shavers. 
3. That the defendant, while having a 
limited understanding of English, has an adequate 
command of the English language to fully 
understand the proceedings before this Court and 
the conditions of probation as presented by Agent 
Shavers. 
4. That the defendant knowingly, 
intentionally and purposely refused to sign the 
probation agreement presented ot him by Agent 
Shavers. 
5. That the failure of the defendant to 
execute and enter into the agreement of probation 
constitutes a violation of the probation granted 
the defendant by the Court. 
While the evidence largely supports findings 1, 2, and 4, 
points I and II of this brief demonstrate that because Mr. Ruesga 
did not know that signing the probation agreement was a condition of 
his probation when he refused to sign it, his refusal to sign the 
agreement does not constitute a willful violation of a valid 
condition of probation. Because the trial court's fifth finding 
does not recognize this critical fact, and is also thus drafted with 
an incomplete view of the relevant law, the finding is clearly 
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erroneous. Cf. Jackson, Bobo, Arroyo, supra. 
The trial court's third written finding, indicating that 
Mr. Ruesga#s command of the English language was sufficient for him 
to understand what had occurred in court and the probation 
conditions stated by Agent Shavers is clearly erroneous. First, the 
finding fails to incorporate the law that it is the trial court's 
duty to articulate the conditions of probation, and that it is 
unfair to expand the conditions of probation retroactively to create 
a violation. E.g. Penney, supra. While there is some evidence to 
marshall in support of the facts asserted in the third finding, the 
evidence is insufficient when compared with other evidence in light 
of Utah law. 
In his oral findings,3 the trial court concluded that Mr. 
Ruesga understood enough English because he had not indicated a 
failure to understand English in prior proceedings, had participated 
in the Boykin process and reviewed the affidavit during the plea 
proceedings (the affidavit indicates that Mr. Ruesga understands 
English or had had an interpreter (R. 26)), and had handwritten and 
read the letter presented to the trial court at the evidentiary 
3. Reference to oral findings is proper practice. See e.g. 
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989)("In assessing the 
sufficiency of the findings [in a domestic bench trial], ... we are 
not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled 
"Findings"; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the 
bench or contained in other documents, such as the quite thorough 
memorandum decision of the trial court in this case.")(footnotes, 
citing inter alia Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), omitted). See 
also State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 273-74 (Utah App.)(written 
findings of fact are not necessary if court can discern basis of 
revocation from transcript and record of proceedings), cert, denied. 
No. 900501 (Dec. 26, 1990). 
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hearing (T.4 22-23). 
The trial court's indication that Mr. Ruesga had not 
previously indicated an inability to understand (T.4 22) is clearly 
erroneous. At the first hearing on the order to show cause why 
probation should not be revoked, Mr. Ruesga indicated to the court 
that he had received the order to show cause, but did not understand 
it (T.2 3). At the second hearing, defense counsel attributed Mr. 
Ruesga's failure to sign the probation agreement to his failure to 
understand the obligation, and indicated that defense counsel and 
the pretrial services supervisor had initial difficulty 
communicating with Mr. Ruesga (T.3 5, 7). At the third hearing 
defense counsel repeated his concerns that Mr. Ruesga's heavy accent 
and previous difficulties communicating with defense counsel were 
indicative of his difficulty understanding the court proceedings 
(T.4 19) . 
As Mr. Ruesga testified, he had assistance composing the 
letter he wrote and read to the trial court (T.4 10). The same 
alphabet is used in Spanish and English, and Mr. Ruesga's ability to 
handwrite and read a letter that someone else assisted him in 
composing does not necessarily indicate that Mr. Ruesga had an 
adequate understanding of the court proceedings. 
While Mr. Ruesga had participated in the Bovkin process and 
signed the plea affidavit, testimony concerning the confrontation 
between Mr. Ruesga and the probation officers demonstrates that Mr. 
Ruesga did not have an adequate command of the English language to 
understand the court proceedings, and that this contributed to the 
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purported probation violation. For instance, Mr. Ruesga thought 
that Ms. Shavers presented the wrong figure when she told him that 
he owed a fine of $1,875 (T.4 6). The figure represents the $1,500 
fine stated at sentencing, plus the 25% surcharge stated at the 
sentencing (T.4 6; T. 8). Mr. Ruesga's inability to understand the 
proceedings is demonstrated by the fact that he thought that his 
sentence would be eighteen months if he did not complete probation 
(T.4 14). The probation period ordered by the trial court was 
eighteen months, but the suspended sentence that Mr. Ruesga has to 
serve without probation is the zero to five year prison sentence (R. 
33) . 
The trial court's cursory ruling at the outset of the 
evidentiary hearing in response to defense counsel's request for an 
interpreter, "Too late. Proceed." (T.4 3), demonstrates a failure 
to appreciate the significance of the need of a criminal defendant 
or probationer to understand the proceedings in order to exercise 
his rights. 
In State v. Vasquez. 121 P.2d 903 (Utah 1942), the court 
reviewed a trial court's refusal to provide an interpreter for the 
defendant, whose native language was Spanish, and who also was 
unable to hear some of the witnesses. The court drew from cases 
decided under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
explaining that when a defendant cannot hear or understand the 
proceedings, he is unable to "appear and defend in person" or to 
confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 905. The court 
discussed at length the fact that a defendant who cannot understand 
-20-
the language of the proceedings cannot obtain a fair trial or 
meaningfully exercise his trial rights. Id. at 906. In holding 
that the State should provide interpreters for indigent defendants, 
the court noted, "Although nominally prosecuting, the state is as 
interested in proving the innocence as the guilt of the party 
charged." Id. at 906. The court concluded, "'if in any such case, 
the record indicates a failure to provide an interpreter has in any 
manner hampered the defendant in presenting his case to the jury, we 
shall hold a fair and impartial trial has been denied him.,M Id. at 
906 (citation omitted, emphasis added). See also State v. Drobel, 
815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah 1991)("Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, provides that a trial court 'may appoint an interpreter 
of its own selection. ... ,,f While this decision is a matter of 
discretion, our supreme court has held that it is better, in a 
questionable case, to err on the side of providing an interpreter. 
State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903, 906 (1942). . . . 
Failure to appoint an interpreter, however, is reversible error only 
when the record shows that the defendant's presentation of the case 
has thereby been hampered. Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 906."). 
While the Vasquez and Drobel cases are set in the context 
of criminal trials, rather than the context of probation revocation, 
their principles ring true in this case. Because Mr. Ruesga did not 
understand English well enough, his ability to exercise all of his 
rights, including the right to understand the conditions of 
probation, was compromised. The people of this State have an 
interest in seeing that Mr. Ruesga has a fair opportunity to succeed 
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in assimilating back into society through probation. By failing to 
recognize the contribution that language barriers made in this case, 
the trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's rights and disserved society's 
interest in Mr. Ruesga's success. The trial court's finding that 
Mr. Ruesga's command of the English language was adequate is clearly 
erroneous. Jackson, Bobo, Arroyo, supra. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Mr. 
Ruesga violated his probation by his "abuse" of Agent Shavers (T.4 
21-22). This findincf is clearly erroneous because it reflects a 
misunderstanding of the law. 
The trial court never informed Mr. Ruesga that his 
probation was conditioned on his conversations with Agent Shavers. 
This was not a condition of probation, and Mr. Ruesga did not 
willfully violate it. See points I and II, supra. More 
importantly, Mr. Ruesga was not given notice that the probation 
revocation hearings would encompass any allegations other than his 
failure to sign the probation agreement, the only allegation in the 
order to show cause (R. 38). In revoking probation on the basis of 
this unwarned allegation, the trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's 
rights to due process of law. See State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 
211 (Utah App. 1991)(if, in probation revocation, court relies on 
bases other than those alleged in documents initiating probation 
revocation, defendant is denied the due process rights to notice and 
the chance to present a defense), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981)(documents giving 
notice of grounds for probation revocation must be drawn so as to 
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give sufficient notice to allow a defense; court may not revoke 
probation on the basis of allegations or evidence not mentioned in 
order to show cause). 
Finally, the court found that Mr. Ruesga had violated his 
probation in refusing to sign the probation agreement at the first 
hearing on the motion for an order to show cause why probation 
should not be revoked. The court stated, 
I think that's further enhanced by what has 
occurred since that was brought to my attention. 
One would assume if there is a misunderstanding 
as alleged by the defendant, that I found did not 
occur, but he understood what was happening, but 
even if that was believable, which it is not, 
certainly when he found out what was going to 
happen, one would expect him to immediately do 
what was necessary to remedy the situation for 
his first appearance in court. The record will 
speak for itself. But his first appearance in 
court, according to my recollection, was further 
attempts to argue and explain why he didn't have 
to do the things he was supposed to do. 
(T.4 21)(emphasis added). The court indicated that there was "a 
clear opportunity to sign" the probation agreement, and that his 
refusal to sign constituted a probation violation (T.4 21). 
When defense counsel sought to correct the court, and 
indicated that Mr. Ruesga had not refused to sign the agreement in 
court, the court stated, 
Not true, Mr. Scowcroft. He may have said 
it as he was going out the door, but he wanted to 
argue with me the first time he was here. I'm 
not going to argue with people about probation. 
If they don't want to be on probation, I don't 
care. 
(T.4 23). 
This finding was clearly erroneous as a matter of fact and 
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law. 
Mr. Ruesga's only statements at that hearing wherein the 
court thought he had refused to sign the agreement were that he was 
Fernando Ruesga, and that he had seen the motion for an order to 
show cause, but did not understand it (T. 3). 
Again, in revoking probation on the basis of an allegation 
that was not contained in the affidavit in support of the motion for 
an order to show cause why probation should not be revoked, the 
trial court violated Mr. Ruesga's right to due process of law. 
Martinez. Cowdell supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This probation revocation was fundamentally unfair, in 
violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's order revokina Mr. Ruesga's probation. 
( J 
Respectfully submitted this^T/^^day of October, 1992. 
^-^c^C**-
ROGER K. SC0WCR0FT 
Attorney for,Mr. Ruesg 
m 
ELIZABETH IfPLBfeOOK 
Attorney foirJMr. Ruesga 
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APPENDIX 1 
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-18.1. Suspension of sentence—Probation— 
Supervision—Presentence investigation— 
Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and 
conditions— Restitution—Termination/ 
revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings. 
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or 
extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a 
finding in court that the probationer has 
violated the conditions of probation. 
Probation may not be revoked except upon a 
hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit 
alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of 
probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of 
probation is justified. If the court 
determines there is probable cause, it shall 
cause to be served on the defendant a 
warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked, modified, 
or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall 
specify a time and place for the hearing, 
and shall be served upon the defendant at 
least five days prior to the hearing. The 
defendant shall show good cause for a 
continuance. The order to show cause shall 
inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to 
have counsel appointed for him if he is 
indigent. The order shall also inform the 
defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant 
shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. If the defendant denies the 
allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence 
on the allegations. The persons who have 
given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as 
witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause 
otherwise orders. The defendant may call 
witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After the hearing the court shall 
make findings of fact. Upon a finding that 
the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation the court may order the probation 
revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides: 
77-23-1. "Search warrant11 defined. 
A search warrant is an order issued by a 
magistrate in the name of the state and directed 
to a peace officer, describing with particularity 
the thing, place or person to be searched and the 
property or evidence to be seized by him and 
brought before the magistrate. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters. 
(a) The court may appoint any expert 
witness agreed upon by the parties or of its own 
selection. An expert so appointed shall be 
informed of his duties by the court in writing, a 
copy of which shall be filed. An expert so 
appointed shall advise the court and the parties 
of his findings and may thereafter be called to 
testify by the court or by any party. He shall 
be subject to cross-examination by each party. 
The court shall determine the reasonable 
compensation of the expert and direct payment 
thereof. The parties may call expert witnesses 
of their own at their own expense. Upon showing 
that a defendant is financially unable to pay the 
fees of an expert whose services are necessary 
for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be 
paid as if he were called on behalf of the 
prosecution. 
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter 
of its own selection and shall determine 
reasonable compensation and direct payment 
thereof. The court may allow counsel to question 
the interpreter before he is sworn to discharge 
the duties of an interpreter. 
APPENDIX 2 
Written Findings of Probation Violation 
SaltXak© Cbuhly^Attorney" 
WALTER R. ELLETT, 0980 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FERNANDO RUESGA, 
Defendant. 
) 
) FINDINGS OF PROBATION 
VIOLATION AND COMMITMENT 
) 
Case No. 911901842FS 
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen 
) 
Having heretofore adjudged the defendant guilty of the offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, the Court, on the 
6th day of April, 1992, imposed sentence on the defendant that the defendant be 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the term not to exceed five years, and 
was fined as provided by law for the offense of which the defendant was 
adjudged guilty. 
The Court stayed the execution of such sentences and placed the 
defendant on probation in the custody of the Chief Agent, Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, upon various conditions. 
On the 2nd day of June, 1992, the defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Roger Scowcroft, to answer to an affidavit in support of an Order of 
Show Cause in re the revocation OT defendant's probation. The State was 
represented by Walter R. Ellett. 
The Court received evidence by way of testimony and written exhibits. 
Exhibit number 2 was a hand written and signed statement prepared by and 
submitted by the defendant. 
Based upon the evidence presented and considering arguments of 
counsel the Court finds as follows: 
1. That the defendant, when requested by probation officer Lisa 
Shavers, refused to execute a standard probation agreement. 
2. That the terms and conditions of probation were individually 
explained to defendant by Agent Shavers. 
3. That the defendant, while having a limited understanding of 
English, has an adequate command of the English language to fully understand 
the proceedings before this Court and the conditions of probation as presented 
by Agent Shavers. 
4. That the defendant knowingly, intentionally and purposely refused 
to sign the probation agreement presented to him by Agent Shavers. 
5. That the failure of the defendant to execute and enter into the 
agreement of probation constitutes a violation of the probation granted the 
defendant by the Court. 
From the foregoing findings the Court now enters the following order and 
judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the probation of the defendant Fernando Ruesga be and the 
same is hereby revoked. 
2. It is further ordered that the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah take the defendant Fernando Ruesga forthwith and deliver him to the 
000Cf;n 
^WSfdenl'Utah State Prison, Draper /UT, where said defendant snail De connnea 
ana impnsonea in accordance with the sentence imposed on April 6,1992. 
3. It is recommended that the defendant be given credit for time 
served in this matter. 
Dated this I day of June, 1992. 
BY TflE COURT 
U 
'/TIMOTHY R. H A N ^ E N X ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY ^rf^^2^ 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Findings and Order to Roger Scowcroft, 
Attorney for Defendant, by placing the same in the Legal Defenders Association 
courier box at the Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, 
for pick-up and delivery to the said Roger Scowcroft this 5 day of June, 1992. 
carol\memo\ruesga.doc y 
y/< kk&fxH 
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APPENDIX 3 
Trial Court's Oral Sentence 
1 to the crime of possession of a controlled substance, a 
2 third degree felony, it's the judgment of this Court that 
3 you be committed to the Utah State Prison for the 
4 judgment, that's the indeterminate term which may be for 
5 as long as five years, and I also impose the maximum fine 
6 of $5,000. Mr. Ruesga, as I review this, while most of 
7 these records have been destroyed, I don't know what's 
8 happened, I don't make any decision one way or another in 
9 that regard, but I think that shows to me that there 
10 isn't sufficient justification for deviating from the 
11 guidelines in this case, nor am I otherwise impressed 
12 that the guidelines ought to be deviated from. I have no 
13 indication whether these prior charges were convictions, 
14 whether they ever occurred. And if the file has been 
15 destroyed, that's unfortunate, but it has. Accordingly, 
16 I do believe that you're an appropriate candidate for 
17 probation. Accordingly, I'm going to deviate from the 
18 recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, because I 
19 can see no legal basis as to why they should deviate from 
20 the guidelines. 
21 I am going to place you on probation for a period of 
22 eighteen months, supervised by Adult Probation and Parole 
23 under the following terms and conditions. I'll suspend 
24 all but $1,500 of the fine. Added to that is the 
25 twenty-five percent surcharge. The Court is satisfied 
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1 that terms and conditions ought to include the usual drug 
2 and alcohol conditions. You're not to use controlled 
3 substances, you're not to have paraphernalia in your 
4 possession, you're not to associate with people who use 
5 controlled substances, and you are not to have any 
6 prescriptions, or — from a medical Doctor, without your 
7 probation officer knowing about it. 
8 As far as alcohol, you're not to use alcohol during 
9 the period of time that you're on probation. You are to 
10 enter into, and successfully complete any drug or alcohol 
11 programs Adult Probation and Parole thinks is 
12 appropriate. Not to, like I say, use alcohol. You're 
13 not to frequent bars during the period of time that 
14 you're on probation. I want you working full-time, and I 
15 want you to establish a permanent address. 
16 The sanction in this, Mr. Ruesga, will be that you 
17 serve six months in the county jail. I'll give you 
18 credit for the twenty-one days that you've already 
19 served. Commitment is forthwith. Take him into custody. 
20 
21 * * * 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 9 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
APPENDIX 4 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
vs. 
FERNANDO RUESGA CPTS) 
Defendant. 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter _ 
Bailiff 
Date 
9119018^2 FS 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
E. THOMPSON 
B. NEUENSCHWANDER 
J , WEISS 
APRIL 6, 1992 
D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted Q denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; & plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
 a felony 
of the 1 degree, O a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented **• S C 0 W C R O F T and the State being represented by K - H 0 R N A K , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
(3 not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
iS and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 5,000 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) — — — — — . i _ _ _ _ _ are herebv dismissed 
$1,500 OF THE FINE TO BE PAID ALONG WITH A 25% SURCHARGE THE COURT SUSPENDS ALL BUT 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Qcprison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of _ 1 S MONTHS pursuant to the attached<tonditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Cou^fy D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jaik'where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and CommUment 
Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 6 - day of J92. 
COPIES TO COUNSEL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
. TIMOTHY R. 
ATTEST 
HANSON 
f\ r\ ^ +•< ,-» ~ 
9119018^2 FS 
i M .n* /c^» FERNANDO RUESGA ,nD / u . . HANSON 
Judgment/State v. /CR /Honorable 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
JO Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
& Serve SIX MONTHS 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing FORTHWITH. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVFD. 
& Pay a fine In the amount of $JU5flfiL) at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or cXat the rate of W I T H I N T H F PRORATION P F R I O D . A 2S % SURPHAPCF APPI TFS . 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or D in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or • at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
& Enter, participate in, and complete any , DRIJG/A1 fDHOI program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with . z. 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
JO Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
B Submit to drug testing." 
XJ Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
JO Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
JO Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
JO Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
JO Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
JO Take antabuse C)<as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
JO Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
%1 Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence 
X3 THF nFFFNfWJT i q TO FCjTARI T^H PF^inFMrY 
D 
D 
D 
O 
D 
DATED this 6_ day of 
r?! l§JRICT*COURT JUDGE i f io fhY R, HANSON 
-T \ ^N **v ^ 
